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Abstract 
This paper examined the association between the effect of financial performance and board 
size on corporate executive compensation in Nigeria. In accomplishing the research 
objectives of this study, the audited annual financial statement of listed banks covering the 
period 2005-2013 were analyzed. Also, a total of 10 listed banks in the Nigerian stock 
exchange market were selected and analyzed for the study using the purposive sampling 
method. Nevertheless, in analyzing the research hypotheses, the study adopted the use of both 
descriptive statistics and econometric analysis using the pooled ordinary least square 
regression analysis method in the estimation of the regression equation. Findings from the 
study show that a significant positive relationship was observed between banks financial 
performance and the corporate executive compensation (director’s emoluments) for the 
sampled banks. 
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Introduction 
Monetary upsurges around the globe and coupled with the series of major corporate failures 
in the United States of America, Asia, Europe and even Africa have brought to the spotlight, 
the requirement for the act of great corporate administration, which are situated standards, 
traditions, arrangements, laws and foundations influencing the way a partnership is 
coordinated, regulated or controlled. Executive compensation in most of the developed 
economies has been criticized as playing a critical or salient role in accounting for some of 
the recent global financial crisis [1,2]. Evidence from prior literature shows that there is an 
association between the executive officer emoluments and bank default risk. Vallascas et al. 
[3] in a study of CEO compensation in the U.S and Europe observed that banks with CEO 
stock options display higher default risk. 
Executive compensation has drawn the attention of accountants, economists and much 
consideration from researchers in the last two decade. However, most of the academic work 
on executive compensation has focused on a couple of developed nations, for example, the 
U.S. also, the U.K., principally because of information accessibility. Basically, it is described 
as a predetermined relationship that endeavors to bring into line the motivations of top 
managers with the welfares of shareholders [4]. The theory generally supports that CEO 
motivations and corporate governance according to Bushman et al. [5] have been seen to 
have a significant impact on CEO pay. Therefore, in developed economies, CEO stock 
options and equity motivation are frequently utilized to align with shareholders’ wealth. 
Nevertheless, recent studies cast doubts on the effectiveness of commonly used market-
based corporate governance mechanisms in developed economies being able to achieve 
similar results in emerging economies [6,7]. 
Hence, in the light of the mounting enthusiasm for the basic part that corporate governance 
may play in monetary improvement notwithstanding; it is imperative to examine how firms in 
developing nations compensate their top executives. Specifically, for developing economies 
attempting to change their state-claimed undertakings into profitable modern firms through 
different change measures. To this end, this study looked at the effect of financial 
performance and board size on corporate executive compensation in Nigeria. In essence, the 
study will attempt to find out whether executive remuneration can be influenced by board 
size and the financial performance of banks. The remaining part of this paper has been 
organized as follow: Section 2 basically looked at prior relevant literature relevant to this 
study and the development of hypotheses to be tested in this study. Section 3 describes the 
methodology adopted for the study. Section 4 provides detailed discussion of the various 
findings, while section 5 provides insights into the conclusion and recommendations from the 
study. 
Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 
There are numerous definitions of corporate governance; according to the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development Principles, corporate governance is described as 
the relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders, and other 
stakeholders. According to Uwuigbe [8]; Uwalomwa et al. [9], corporate governance is 
described as a system by which companies are directed and managed in the best interest of 
the owners and investors. It refers to the role of the board of directors, executives and non-
executives, shareholders’ right and other actions taken by shareholders to influence corporate 
decisions. In essence, it fundamentally offers motivations to management to focus and work 
towards the interest and benefits of company and its shareholders. The presence of a good 
corporate governance framework within an organization and on a macroeconomic scale or 
level will provide a degree of assurance that is required for the running of a market economy. 
The theoretical foundation for this study is anchored on the proposition of the agency theory. 
The theory argues that the separation of ownership from control of business gives rise to the 
tendency of managers to seek to maximize their own utility and pursue interest in conflict to 
that of owners [4,10]. In order to reduce these conflicts and their adverse effects on firm 
value, a variety of corporate governance mechanisms have been devised to keep corporate 
managers in check. This suggests that managers will basically act to fulfill their self-
interested. Rather than being altruistic. Hence, individuals (managers) cannot be trusted to 
act in the interest of investors. In essence, directors will always want to maximize their 
utilities functions, the agency theory therefore considered managers and shareholders 
relationship as a contract [8]. This implies that managers’ actions must be properly monitored 
to ensure that they always act in shareholders’ best interest. According to Fama et al. [11] 
agency theory offers many useful ways to examine the relationship between business owners 
and managers and most importantly, the association between separation of ownership and 
control which is known to be accountable for the agency problem and other issues relating to 
managerial compensation. 
However, based on the assumptions of the agency theory, there is a plethora of prior related 
literature that examined the relationship between corporate governance on corporate 
executive compensation from various perspectives. For example, Lloyed [12] in a study of 
384 firms listed in the Turkish stock market observed that the company market value-to-sales 
ratio is greater for firms with high executive compensation. Mehran [13] opined that the 
framework to align the motivations of managers to the motivations of investors is to link 
managers’ compensation to firm’s performance. Core et al. [14] offer evidence that suggests 
that concentration of ownership of CEO shareholdings or outside block holders is a 
decreasing function of manager’s emoluments. Mululu [15] in a related study argued that the 
corporate governance arrangements are subject to more influence from top management 
officer and are associated with higher levels of top CEO emoluments. These results are in line 
with the presence of agency costs linked with weak corporate governance, where top 
management or board members wield his bargaining power to extract rents at the expense of 
shareholders. 
In the same vein, Thomsen et al. [16] reported a positive association between executive 
remuneration and profitability. Also, Thomsen et al. [16] in a related study observed that after 
controlling for other variables, executive compensation had a positive relation with a 
market-to-book value of equity as well as the return on assets which is a measure of 
profitability. Likewise, Yermack [17] and Holthausen et al. [18] where it was observed that a 
relationship exists between pay-performance board size. In addition Holthausen et al. [19]; 
Core et al., [14]; Ozkan [20] in a related study observed a significant positive relationship 
between board size and CEO remuneration. 
Besides, Sigler [21] in a related study examined the relationship between CEO pay and 
company performance for 280 firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange. He observed 
that both with a descriptive and inferential statistic, a significant positive relationship exist 
between total CEO compensation and firm’s performance measured by return on equity was 
established. It was also observed that the size of the firms appears to be the most significant 
factor in determining the level of total CEO compensation. In the same vein, studies have 
also been carried out in countries such as New Zealand, Norway Sweden, Hong Kong, and 
Japan. However, the same cannot be said for developing economies like Nigeria especially in 
the face of the current economic recession. Were most organization are folding up and others 
are currently downsizing their work force. Hence, it is against this backdrop that the study 
develops the following hypothesis. 
Development of Hypotheses 
Drawing from the literature, the hypotheses to be tested in this study are stated below in their 
null forms 
1. H1: There is no relationship between financial performance and corporate executive 
compensation of banks in Nigeria. 
2. H2: There is no relationship between board size and the corporate executive compensation 
of banks in Nigeria 
Methodology 
In accomplishing the research objectives of this study, the audited annual financial statement 
of listed banks covering the period 2005-2013 was analyzed. The choice of these periods 
arises based on the fact that the period was plagued with a plethora of corporate 
frauds/failures arising from poor corporate governance practice. However, a total of 10 listed 
banks in the Nigerian stock exchange market were selected and analyzed for the study using 
the purposive sampling method. Nevertheless, in analyzing the research hypotheses, the study 
adopted the use of both descriptive statistics and econometric analysis using the pooled 
ordinary least square regression analysis method in the estimation of the regression 
equation. 
Specifications of the Econometric Model 
The data are to be analyzed using the regression analysis which could be termed to be a 
statistical technique used to find relationships between variables for the purpose of predicting 
future values. Using the formula; 
CorpExCo+mp=F (ROAit, Bsize, TAit, Ut) (1) 
This can be written in explicit form as: 
CorpExCompit=β0+ β1ROAit + β2Bsizeit + β3TAit + μit 
Where: 
CorpExComp=Corporate executive compensation. This is measured by Directors' 
Emolument. 
ROA=Return on Asset. This is computed by dividing profit before tax by the total assets of the 
Firm. It is a proxy for firm performance. 
BSIZE=Board size is measured as the number of board members in an organization. 
TA=Total assets here is used as the control variable. It includes both the non-current and 
current assets of an organization. 
β=Coefficient of parameter 
it=Time coefficient 
μ=Error term 
A priori specification 
The expectations for the co-efficient of the model: β1>0, β2<0. 
Discussion of Findings 
Findings from our descriptive statistics as shown in Table 1 present an approximate mean 
value for corporate executive compensation (CorpExCompit) as 444091.2 for the selected 
banks. Similarly, the financial performance (ROA) and board size (Bsize) depicts a mean 
value of 1.630667and 10.85556 respectively for the sampled banks (Table 2). 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CorpExCompit 90 444091.2 260698.7 9510 984773 
ROA 90 1.630667 1.371679 0.01 4.76 
Bsize 90 10.85556 1.71288 7 15 
TA 90 8953557 2.14e+07 53312 9.95e+07 
Table 2: Test of Correlation between Dependent and Independent Variables. 
Variable CorpExCompit ROA Bsize TA   
CorpExCompit ROA 
1.000 
1.0000     0.5727 
0.0000 
Variable CorpExCompit ROA Bsize TA   
Bsize 
-0.2475 -0.0873 
1.0000   
0.0187 0.4133 
TA 
0.3698 0.3124 -0.0579 
1.0000 
0.0003 0.0027 0.5877 
Source: Field Work (2015) 
The result from the Pearson Correlation as depicted in Table 2 indicates that there is a strong 
positive correlation between corporate executive compensation (directors’ emolument) and 
the financial performance of banks. This is evident in the correlation coefficient value of 
(r=0.5727) and it is significant at a 5% probability level. Also, the table also presents that 
there is a strong negative correlation between corporate executive compensation (directors’ 
emolument) and board size of the selected banks. This is also evident in the correlation 
coefficient value of (r=-0.2475) and it is significant at a 5% probability level. Furthermore, 
the test for multicollinearity was carried out before analyzing the regression model. 
According to Field (2000), this test is necessary because multicollinearity can affect the 
parameters of a regression model (Table 3). Adeyemi et al. [22] and Uwuigbe et al. [23] 
suggested that a tolerance value less than 0.1 indicates a serious multicollinearity problem 
between the independent variables. Nevertheless, since all values are more than 0.10, there is 
no issue of multicollinearity between the independent variables as depicted in Table 4. Also, 
Myers [24] suggested that a variance inflation factor (VIF) value greater than 10 calls for 
concern, however, for this study, the VIF values are less than 10. 
Table 3: Regression Result. 
Source SS df MS Number of Obs=90 
F (3, 86)=19.53 
Prob> F=0.0000 
R-squared=0.4052 
Adj R-squared=0.3844 
Root MSE=2.0e+05 
Model  2.4508e+12 3 8.1693e+11 
Residual 3.5980e+12 86 4.1837e+10 
Total 6.0488e+12 89 6.7964e+10 
CorpExCompit  Coef. Std. Err. T P>t 95% Conf. Interval] 
ROA 93480.46 16683.66 5.60 0.000 60314.44 126646.5 
Bsize -29334 12712.98 -2.31 0.023 -54607.56 -4062.424 
TA 0.0024989 .0010681 2.34 0.022 0.0003757 0.0046222 
_cons 587729.3 144273.2 4.07 0.000 300923.7 874535 
Predictors: (Constant), ROA, Bsize; Dependent Variable: CorpExCompit. Source: Field 
Work (2015) 
Table 4: Variance Inflation Factor. 
Variable VIF I/VIF 
ROA  1.11   0.897602 
TA 1.11   0.901459 
Variable VIF I/VIF 
Bsize 1.01 0.991341 
Mean VIF 1.08   
Empirical findings on the results of the goodness of fit test as shown in Table 3 present an 
adjusted R2 value of about 0.3844. This, in a nutshell, means that the value of the dependent 
variable can be explained by about 38% of the independent variables. This value can be 
considered sufficient because the corporate executive compensation of the selected banks is 
also influenced by other factors besides financial performance and board size [25]. In the 
same vein, result on the analysis of variance (Fishers - test) as reflected in Table 3 presents a 
p-value that is less than 0.05 (i.e. p-value<0.05) [26]. This outcome suggests clearly that 
simultaneously the explanatory variables are significantly associated with the dependent 
variable (i.e. corporate executive compensation). In other words, the F-statistics prove the 
validity of the estimated models which are statistically significant at 1% as shown by the F-
probabilities. 
Empirical findings from our research suggest that consistent with our prior expectations (i.e. 
β1>0), a significant positive relationship was observed between banks financial performance 
and the corporate executive compensation (director’s emoluments) for the sampled banks. 
This is evident in the probability and t-statistics values of (P>|t|=5.560 and 0.000; suggesting 
a rejection of the null hypothesis and the acceptance of the alternate proposition. This 
outcome implies that an increase in the financial performance of the sampled banks will also 
lead to an increase in the emoluments of the directors. This outcome supports the 
methodological juxtaposition of Thomsen et al. [16] and Sigler [21] where they observed a 
significant positive relationship between total CEO compensation and company performance. 
However, consistent with our prior expectation (i.e. β2<0), findings on the second hypothesis 
suggest that there is a significant negative association between board size and the corporate 
executive compensation (i.e. director’s emoluments) for the sampled banks. This outcome is 
evident in the probability and t-statistics values of (P>|t|=0.023 and -2.31). This outcome 
basically implies that there is an inverse relationship between board size and corporate 
executive compensation (i.e. director’s emoluments) for the sampled banks. 
Conclusion 
This study basically examined the effect of financial performance measures and board size on 
corporate executive compensation of selected listed banks in Nigeria. Findings from shows 
that financial performance banks significantly impacts on corporate executive compensation. 
That is, as the financial performance of banks improves, director’s emoluments also tend to 
increase. However, the study observed a significant negative relationship board size and 
corporate executive compensation (i.e. director’s emoluments) for the sampled banks. 
Limitation of Study 
Considering only the banking sector in this study is a major limitation in this study. Hence 
this study suggests that future research in this area could address this limitation by examining 
other corporate governance variables not considered in this study. 
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